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THE IMPACT OF REFORM ON WOMEN'S ECONOMIC SECURITY

ProfessorKaren C. Burke
PROF. BURKE: Thank you.
I would like to take up where Lea Abdnor left off and then
move to the topic of my co-authored paper, which will appear in the
same volume as this symposium. Lea has talked about the advantages
of privatization. Since she has been frank about where she stands, let
me also be frank. I have previously co-authored an article entitled
PrivatizingSocial Security: Eight Myths.46 You may disagree about
whether eight is the right number, but I still regard them as myths.
What Lea has proposed is a privatized system with a level of
minimum guaranteed benefits. Such a system would separate the
earnings-related and redistributive components of the current system.
The proposed reform would preserve a minimum social safety net and
overlay that with a system of personal retirement accounts. She says,
let's just carve out some portion of the existing payroll tax to finance
private accounts: two, three, four, five percent or maybe even more.
Now, obviously, if you take a tremendous amount of money, five
percent or more of payroll, and put it into the private system, let it
earn stock market returns and then, as many privatizers do, discount
that at a risk-free rate of return, you will come out with a tremendous
money's-worth analysis. So, I think it is important to be careful about
what we are comparing. We must recognize that a money's-worth
analysis may not be very useful in comparing different plans with
different investment portfolios.
Lea also mentioned the idea of an opt-out provision that would
allow some people to choose between remaining in the current system
or opting out entirely. My own guess, as a tax lawyer, is that an optout provision would be tremendously difficult to implement as a
practical matter. But let's leave that for further consideration.
of Minnesota Law School.
46 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social

Security: Eight Myths, 74 TAX NOTES 1167 (1997).
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Let me turn to the topic of my co-authored paper. We focus
on how women fare under the existing Social Security system and
how they would fare under a privatized system. We also offer some
suggestions for reform within the existing system.
If you look at the statistics, there is currently a substantial
disparity between men and women in old age in terms of economic
security. Even with the existing safety net, around 13 percent of
elderly women live in poverty. Without Social Security, over 52
percent of elderly women would be below the poverty line. Married
couples are likely to be relatively prosperous in retirement, but
survivors (typically women) fare much less well. The poverty rate for
elderly unmarried women is nearly four times as high as for elderly
married couples. Thus, the existing system arguably overprotects
married couples and underprotects survivors.
Eugene Steuerle, in his presentation, told us a little bit about
how we got to where we are now. We did not intentionally plan to
underprotect survivors, but that is where we have ended up. The
current system of spousal benefits is anachronistic and often provides
an upside-down subsidy to those who are relatively well off. It favors
one-earner couples over two-earner couples and single individuals.
The disparate treatment of one- and two-earner couples is accentuated
at the death of the first spouse. Assume that a one-earner couple and a
two-earner couple each have equal incomes, but the two-earner
couple's income is split evenly between the spouses. Under the
current system, the surviving spouse in the two-earner couple actually
receives less survivor protection than the surviving spouse in the oneearner couple.
Clearly, we need to ameliorate that unintended disparity.
While the existing system is flawed, there are a number of proposals
that would improve both equity and adequacy. I am concerned that
privatizing proposals may distract us from consideration of concrete
reforms such as setting a minimum survivor benefit at, let's say, 75
percent of the couple's benefit. Increased survivor benefits should be
coupled with adjustments in the existing system of spousal benefits.
A married couple would have somewhat lower benefits while both
spouses are alive, but the survivor would have correspondingly higher
benefits.
Shifting benefits from couples to survivors could be
accomplished in a cost-neutral manner. Such incremental reform is
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intended to address problems of both equity and adequacy within the
existing system.
Let me make some brief comments about how women would
likely fare under a privatized system. Perhaps we should ask more
broadly how both men and women would fare under privatization. If
you are skeptical about a naive money's-worth analysis, it is not clear
that a privatized system would necessarily provide higher returns for
most people, let alone women. Even assuming that some groups may
benefit from privatization, how would women fare? One problem is
that women tend to be lower earners. Thus, they would tend to fare
less well under a system linking benefits more closely to earnings.
Women benefit not only from the progressivity of the existing benefit
structure but also from longevity protection.
Now when we were talking about privatized accounts earlier,
we did not discuss whether annuitization of account balances should
be required, nor did we ask whether annuities should be calculated on
a sex-neutral basis. Also, we didn't specify whether earnings-sharing
would be a feature of a privatized system. These crucial issues are
addressed differently under the various proposals for partial
privatization. However, let us take as one example the proposal for
personal security accounts (PSAs) - the most ambitious privatization
proposal described in the Advisory Council's report. The PSA
proposal would allow lump sum withdrawals and would allow the
individual owner of the account to leave the account to beneficiaries
other than the surviving spouse. There would be no provision for
sharing of earnings between spouses. Clearly, you have to look
carefully at the details of particular privatization proposals to
understand the potential consequences.
Perhaps there are philosophical reasons for allowing
unfettered control of private accounts, but the likely outcome would
be greater insecurity for women, especially survivors. Absent added
protection for survivors (and divorced spouses), private accounts
might simply invite financial abandonment of the economically
weaker party. Of course, we could subject private accounts to a host
of regulations to attempt to replicate some of the protections afforded
under the current system. Then you have to ask what is the purpose of
such a fundamental change and whether incremental reform might be
a more promising avenue. I think that the bottom line is that most
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women - because they are low and intermittent earners and because
they tend to live longer than men - would fare less well under a
privatized system, at least one modeled on the PSA approach.
There is also a question about whether women invest as wisely
as men do. Well, the broader question is do men invest wisely? Even
a cursory examination of the existing literature on financial literacy is
not going to leave any of us feeling very hopeful. And, even if we
could improve the level of financial education, it strikes me that we
are embarking on something that has tremendous risks compared to
the current system.
Although the current system clearly needs to be overhauled
and is arguably loaded with inequities, it has provided a remarkable
degree of security for the elderly. Moreover, women as a group have
benefited disproportionately from the existing system. All of us who
are baby-boomers should be mindful of how much our own parents'
generation has benefited from the protection afforded by Social
Security. In talking about implicit liabilities under the existing
system, some commentators use the example of a "sickly patriarch. 4 7
The sickly patriarch incurs very large expenses toward the end of his
life and can't pay his medical bills. His children step in and agree to
pay his bills; and the grandchildren do the same. Eventually,
however, the patriarch's great-grandchildren decide they don't want to
make any contribution to cover the debt that has been handed down
through the generations. The problem is that the burden of any
default will fall not on the patriarch, who is long gone, but rather on
the great-grandchildren's own parents. We have to understand that
the windfall transfer to the initial generations has already been largely
incurred. We are going to have to pay that one way or another. Let's
be cautious about how we proceed with fundamental reform and
acknowledge that there are no painless solutions.
Thank you.
PROF. SCHWAB: Our last speaker is Diane Oakley.****
47See John Geanakoplos et al., Social Security Money's Worth, in PROSPECTS
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 79, 87-88 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al.eds., 1999).
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